Sanctions That Treat a Court Like a Threat
On December 18, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced U.S. sanctions on two International Criminal Court judges, Gocha Lordkipanidze of Georgia and Erdenebalsuren Damdin of Mongolia, describing their work as “politicized and illegitimate actions against Israel.” He said so in a public post from his official account on X.
The same day, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control updated the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list to add both judges under the ICC-related program, listing identifying details and the authority tag tied to Executive Order 14203.
The legal engine for those designations is Executive Order 14203, published in the Federal Register, which invokes IEEPA and other statutory authorities to authorize blocking property and restricting entry for specified targets connected to ICC actions the order describes as illegitimate.
The order’s text matters because it does not simply say the United States disagrees with the ICC; it frames ICC activity as a national security and foreign policy concern and sets up a sanctions framework treating the court’s work as consequential enough to warrant economic coercion.
The Government’s Stated Theory: “No Jurisdiction,” Therefore “No Legitimacy”
Rubio’s announced line has been consistent across multiple State Department releases: the United States and Israel are not parties to the Rome Statute and reject ICC jurisdiction, so ICC actions against U.S. or Israeli officials are characterized as illegitimate overreach. That core message appears in the State Department’s public sanction announcements about the ICC, including the June 5, 2025, press statement describing ICC activity as “illegitimate and baseless actions” targeting the United States and Israel.
Congress has written the same claim into proposed legislation. The text of H.R. 23, titled the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act, states as a congressional finding that “the ICC has no legitimacy or jurisdiction over the United States or Israel” because neither is a party to the Rome Statute.
The bill’s findings also reference the ICC prosecutor’s May 2024 announcement of arrest warrant applications for Netanyahu and Gallant and state that those applications “should be condemned in the strongest possible terms.”
What the ICC Actually Did in the Israel-Palestine Docket
The ICC’s public “State of Palestine” situation page records that, on November 21, 2024, the court issued warrants of arrest for senior figures connected to the Gaza conflict, including a warrant associated with Benjamin Netanyahu and another associated with Yoav Gallant.
When the U.S. sanctions the judges who participate in those proceedings, it is sanctioning judicial officials for actions taken in their official capacity, tied to specific ICC case activity.
The ICC’s Answer: “Attack on Judicial Independence”
The ICC’s public reaction has focused less on the Israel-specific dispute and more on the institutional point: sanctioning judges for judicial acts threatens independence and the ability of the court to function. The ICC’s statement describes the U.S. move as a “flagrant attack” on an impartial judicial institution and rejects the sanctions designations.
That framing sets up a straightforward factual tension. The U.S. position says the ICC lacks jurisdiction and legitimacy over U.S. and Israeli nationals because of non-party status, while the ICC position says U.S. sanctions attempt to punish judges for doing what the Rome Statute system requires them to do. The sanctions are not just rhetorical; they trigger concrete consequences like blocked property interests and travel restrictions under the executive order framework.
Putin as the Comparison Point Readers Already Know
A useful baseline for readers is the ICC’s March 17, 2023, arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova. The ICC’s “Ukraine” situation page states that Pre-Trial Chamber II issued those warrants in the Ukraine situation. The press-release text summarizes the alleged war crimes theory and emphasizes that the court found reasonable grounds to believe the charged conduct involved unlawful deportation and transfer of children.
Enforcement realities matter here because the ICC has no police force. The ICC relies on state cooperation to execute warrants. That institutional dependence is part of the factual backdrop for why some warrants become geopolitical symbols more than practical arrest instruments, especially when the target’s home state rejects the court’s authority.
A Visible Pattern
Set the pieces on the table, and the picture becomes readable without commentary. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17, 2023, as reflected on the ICC’s official Ukraine situation page. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and is under no legal obligation to execute ICC arrest warrants. Putin’s August 15, 2025, visit to Alaska occurred without arrest.
After the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, the U.S. government rejected the court’s authority and invoked Executive Order 14203 to impose sanctions on ICC judges connected to those proceedings.
The legitimacy language is also public record. Congress has written “no legitimacy or jurisdiction” into the findings section of ICC-sanctions legislation. The executive order likewise states, in its own words, that the ICC “has engaged in illegitimate and baseless actions” and “has no jurisdiction over the United States or Israel.”
Those statements can sit beside the fact that the United States still builds and deploys a tailored sanctions apparatus around ICC actions, complete with designation criteria, SDN listings, and general licenses for wind-down transactions.
Sanctions as a Form of Engagement
Sanctions are designed to impose tangible consequences. When the United States designates an individual under a sanctions program, it blocks property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction, restricts financial transactions, and limits travel, using enforcement mechanisms administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Executive Order 14203 applies those tools to conduct connected to the International Criminal Court, treating specified ICC actions as triggers for economic and travel restrictions under U.S. law
That choice of instrument is notable. In the same order and in related congressional findings, the U.S. government states that the ICC has “no legitimacy or jurisdiction” over the United States or Israel because neither is a party to the Rome Statute. At the same time, the sanctions framework treats ICC decisions as consequential acts capable of harming U.S. national interests, warranting the same enforcement machinery used for foreign governments, terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal networks.
Taken together, the record reflects a dual posture. The United States formally rejects the ICC’s authority over U.S. and Israeli nationals, while also responding to specific ICC judicial actions with a legal regime reserved for actors whose conduct is treated as operationally significant.
